Tuesday, May 13, 2025

Joint Statement on China-US Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva; China's approach to international economic institutions

Full text: Joint Statement on China-US Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva

China and the United States on Monday released a joint statement on China-U.S. Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva.

By Xinhua | 2025/5/12 15:02:22

China and the United States on Monday released a joint statement on China-U.S. Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva.

The following is the English translation of the full text of the joint statement:

Joint Statement on China-U.S. Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva

The Government of the People's Republic of China ("China") and the Government of the United States of America (the "United States"),

Recognizing the importance of their bilateral economic and trade relationship to both countries and the global economy;

Recognizing the importance of a sustainable, long-term, and mutually beneficial economic and trade relationship;

Reflecting on their recent discussions and believing that continued discussions have the potential to address the concerns of each side in their economic and trade relationship; and

Moving forward in the spirit of mutual opening, continued communication, cooperation, and mutual respect;

The Parties commit to take the following actions by May 14, 2025:

The United States will (i) modify the application of the additional ad valorem rate of duty on articles of China (including articles of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region) set forth in Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, by suspending 24 percentage points of that rate for an initial period of 90 days, while retaining the remaining ad valorem rate of 10 percent on those articles pursuant to the terms of said Order; and (ii) removing the modified additional ad valorem rates of duty on those articles imposed by Executive Order 14259 of April 8, 2025 and Executive Order 14266 of April 9, 2025.

China will (i) modify accordingly the application of the additional ad valorem rate of duty on articles of the United States set forth in Announcement of the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council No. 4 of 2025, by suspending 24 percentage points of that rate for an initial period of 90 days, while retaining the remaining additional ad valorem rate of 10 percent on those articles, and removing the modified additional ad valorem rates of duty on those articles imposed by Announcement of the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council No. 5 of 2025 and Announcement of the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council No. 6 of 2025; and (ii) adopt all necessary administrative measures to suspend or remove the non-tariff countermeasures taken against the United States since April 2, 2025.

After taking the aforementioned actions, the Parties will establish a mechanism to continue discussions about economic and trade relations. The representative from the Chinese side for these discussions will be He Lifeng, Vice Premier of the State Council, and the representatives from the U.S. side will be Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury, and Jamieson Greer, United States Trade Representative. These discussions may be conducted alternately in China and the United States, or a third country upon agreement of the Parties. As required, the two sides may conduct working-level consultations on relevant economic and trade issues.

Reluctant player: China's approach to international economic ins

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Brookings

https://www.brookings.edu › articles › reluctant-player-...

14 Sept 2020 — Much of the American concern with China's role in the global economy is related to the partial integration of the country into the global ...

China has been an active participant in the international economic institutions, namely the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Paris climate agreement. China has generally lived up to its commitments in these institutions, but has been reluctant to take on the stronger responsibilities that fall on developed countries. China’s insistence on being treated as a developing country is a main source of tension in its economic relations with the advanced economies. A further area of tension is that China’s bilateral economic relations with other developing countries do not always meet global standards and norms. From an institutional point of view, it is a problem that China is not a member of the Government Procurement Arrangement within the WTO, the Paris Club of official creditors, or the Development Assistance Committee. There is a chicken-and-egg problem here: the main reason China is not a member is that it has not been willing to take on the associated responsibilities; on the other hand, being outside of these institutions leaves China free to behave differently from the advanced economies.

Much of the American concern with China’s role in the global economy is related to this partial integration of the country into the global economic institutions. I argue that to change China’s behavior and bring its practices into line with advanced country norms would require: (1) recognition that China deserves greater say in the international economic institutions in return for greater responsibility; (2) a willingness to pursue deeper agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) without China if it is not willing to meet the associated standards; and (3) ongoing, intensive dialogue between China and the U.S. aimed at objectionable Chinese practices such as restrictions on imports and investment, weak intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, forced technology transfer, and subsidies to develop specific technologies.

China has been an active participant in international economic institutions…

In the case of the WTO, China has become a very active member since joining in 2001. Between 2006 and 2015, 44 cases — representing more than a quarter of the WTO caseload — involved China as a complainant or as a respondent.1 Only the United States and the European Union had more active cases over the period. Furthermore, in general, when China has lost cases it has changed the necessary laws and regulations and complied with the ruling, though not always as expeditiously as complainants had hoped. Based on this, one could conclude that China’s integration into trade dispute settlement has been relatively successful.

However, China presents a number of unique challenges for the trading regime. Since the Great Recession, WTO litigation has increasingly taken on a dynamic of the U.S., the EU, and Japan versus China. Between 2009 and 2015, China-related cases accounted for 90% of the cases brought by the four big economies vis-à-vis each other. It used to be that cases between the United States, EU, and Japan were common; now, increasingly, they join together against China.2

The problems arise from the dualistic nature of the Chinese economy. While the economy is often characterized as state-dominated, private enterprises are at the heart of China’s dynamic growth. Traditionally, most exports have come from foreign-invested firms. Recently most of the value added in China’s exports has come from the domestic private sector as value chains have lengthened in China. State enterprises dominate in fields such as heavy industry and especially services — finance, telecom, and logistics. These characteristics make it difficult to determine certain legal issues under WTO rules — such as whether a firm is associated with the state, or how to characterize the overall form of China’s economy. These elements also pose issues for certain activities that fall outside the scope of the WTO’s present disciplines. It is difficult, for example, for the WTO to deal with investment restrictions, forced technology transfer, and intellectual property (IP) theft.

China’s relationship with the IMF has changed remarkably in recent years. In the mid-2000s, China allowed its currency to become undervalued and its current account surplus to balloon above 10% of gross domestic product. The U.S. Department of the Treasury put pressure on the IMF to highlight the issue of global imbalances and currency misalignment. There were several years in the mid-2000s in which the IMF team was not welcome in Beijing to carry out their annual Article IV review of macroeconomic policies. China had very large trade surpluses and an undervalued currency for only four years from 2005 to 2008, after which the authorities allowed the yuan to appreciate and made other policy changes that eliminated the large surpluses.3 This is a good example of China adapting to global norms.

Since that time, the China-IMF relationship has evolved into a close partnership. As attention shifted away from the exchange rate, starting around 2009, the IMF focused its China program more on financial supervision with a series of welcome technical interventions and policy advice.4 Quota reform in the IMF, pushed by the United States, shifted shares toward emerging markets, especially China, primarily at the expense of Europe. While China has gained quota share in the IMF, its share still lags far behind its weight in the world economy. In addition to its quota, China also supports IMF programs for other countries by lending money in parallel through various arrangements that the IMF has adopted to augment its resources.

Monday, May 12, 2025

Don’t let power thieves profit

KUALA LUMPUR: About half a billion ringgit has been lost to electricity theft over the last four years, with the bulk of it from illegal crypto mining.

Based on statistics provided by Tenaga Nasional Bhd (TNB), Bukit Aman said there was substantial losses due to illegal cryptocurrency mining which requires a huge amount of computing power.

“Overall, TNB lost about RM520mil to electricity thefts. Most of the cases involved illegal crypto mining operations,” said Bukit Aman Criminal Investigation Department (CID) director Comm Datuk Seri Mohd Shuhaily Mohd Zain (pic).

Five years ago, TNB lost RM9.2mil to power thieves, followed by RM140.6mil in 2021, RM124.9mil (2022), RM67.1mil (2023) and RM138.7mil last year.

As of last month, it registered a RM40.1mil loss.

Comm Mohd Shuhaily told The Star that crypto mining syndicates tend to operate from rented shop lots, warehouses or even residential homes.

He said these criminals would often pick areas where foot traffic was low.

To ensure continuity of their operations, he said the syndicates would run high-powered mining machines 24 hours a day, which generate intense heat and noise.

“Many syndicates would then install heavy duty ventilation systems, air conditioners and soundproofing materials to avoid drawing attention from the neighbours or enforcement authorities.”

As for the power consumption, he said a common tactic used by syndicate members was to illegally bypass the electricity meter by tapping directly into the main power distribution board.

“This allows them to consume massive amounts of electricity – often equivalent to what an entire residential block would use.

“Some syndicates also employ technicians and electrical experts to ensure the illegal wiring is done.

“In more sophisticated setups, surveillance cameras and entry-control mechanisms are installed. And only their insiders are given access to the site,” Comm Mohd Shuhaily said.

These syndicates, he said, were often on the move to avoid detection.

“They would shift their operations every few months to new premises,” he said.

Rental agreements are typically made under false identities or using third-party intermediaries, making it harder to trace the individuals behind the activity, he added.

Comm Mohd Shuhaily said the public should be alert to signs of suspicious activities in their neighbourhoods.

“Common indicators include buildings with heavy-duty ventilation systems operating non-stop, unusual humming or whirring sounds similar to industrial fans, or properties that appear unoccupied or underused but consistently have lights or cooling systems running at odd hours.

“In some cases, residents may notice frequent electrical work.

“If you come across such signs or suspect illegal electricity use, do not approach the site. Instead, report it to the nearest police station or contact TNB’s hotline.

“Your information, no matter how small it may seem, could be crucial in uncovering illegal operations,” he said, adding that these reports would be confidential.

Comm Mohd Shuhaily said there was intensified joint enforcement operations codenamed Ops Letrik in 2023 spearheaded by the CID’s Intelligence, Operation and Records Division (D4).

The division, led by principal assistant director Senior Asst Comm Noor Dellhan Yahaya, had focussed on illegal crypto-mining activities.

“There is also intelligence gathering, increased cooperation with local councils and TNB, and improved public awareness.

“Additionally, advancements in TNB’s detection technology made it easier to identify and isolate suspicious consumption patterns,” he said.

Since 2020, he said 2,488 raids had been conducted under Ops Letrik nationwide.

“We also seized 95,163 crypto-mining machines,” he said.

Comm Mohd Shuhaily said that 918 people had been detained following the raids.

Besides electricity theft caused by illegal crypto mining, he said other culprits included illegal factories and commercial premises which tampered with electricity meters.

He said electricity thefts compromise the integrity and safety of the national power grid.

“Moreover, the illegal nature of these setups often makes enforcement and prosecution more challenging, as the premises may be vacated or operations shifted before authorities can act,” he said.

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